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Interdisciplinary Knowledge: Feminist Teaching, Research, and Activism 
 Feminists’ interdisciplinary work is a critical response to claims that disciplinary 
expertise provides real knowledge. Interdisciplinary teaching, research, and activism 
emerge in opposition to claims that only certain kinds of ideas are valuable. This paper  
will briefly delineate those concepts that have created an intellectual tradition that does 
not recognize the political and strategic elements entailed by all knowledge formation. 
Feminist activism is a reaction to the narrowly defined boundaries of what counts as a 
good idea. The distinction between passive and active knowledge acquisition allows us to 
view feminist teaching, research, and activism as active, ongoing engagements that 
emerge from directed and investigative processes. And, as we shall see, the significance 
of this generative view of ideas lies in an engaged, collaborative effort. On the other 
hand, the significance of knowledge as something buried and awaiting discovery lies only 
in the passive observation of a limited self. 
I 
The Divine Command Theory defines all knowledge as being received from God. 
One waits to be touched by God, God touches them, and knowledge is granted and 
reveals itself. Revealed knowledge is passively received, and this passive acquisition of 
knowledge justifies the belief that Truth is outside the individual. On the other hand, 
knowledge acquisition becomes a more engaging affair when individual people can claim 
to have “discovered” things in nature by themselves. Moreover, when ideas are conceived 
and created by the individuals themselves rather than passively received or simply 
observed, knowledge acquisition moves beyond engaging and into a revolutionary 
practice known as creative or integrated knowledge. This form of knowledge was not 
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only revolutionary; it also constituted a cognitive (albeit blasphemous) paradigm shift 
from God as the Prime Mover, the initiator of all things, to Man. With this shift, 
knowledge acquisition became an active and purposive process. And it was only after this 
shift that we were able to conceive an interdisciplinary form of knowledge that entailed 
the active integration of ideas created by many individuals.  
Yet even though this process of knowledge acquisition entailed the active 
integration of ideas, knowledge was still narrowly defined by discipline and accessed 
only by a few. As far back as ancient Greek civilization, around 300 BCE, experts played 
vital roles in Plato’s ideal society. In fact, the division of labor in Plato’s Republic, and 
indeed the very legitimacy of society, rested on the proficiency of three specialized 
classes of men: the philosopher kings (the intellectuals); the soldiers (the protectorate); 
and the craftsmen (the artistically irrational). And at the turn of the 20th century, a broad 
range of integrated knowledge in medicine was removed from the hands of female 
medical practitioners and midwifes, as well as from local and familial locations, and was 
instead put into the hands of male medical doctors and hospital complexes.  
Specialization was not unique to these time periods; man’s interest and inclination 
to silo knowledge extends to today, the Communication Age. The increased focus on 
disciplinary expertise and specialization drives a heightened level of impatience and 
frustration when an expert cannot be found. However, if we look back to the first and 
second waves of feminism, we will see that the emergence of interdisciplinary feminist 
teaching, research, and activism both corresponds with the rise of disciplinary 
specialization and stands in contrast to it. 
II 
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In order to gain a sense of the history involved in this intellectual evolution, it is 
helpful to refer back to a time when science had not yet emerged as a discipline. For 
example, during the early part of the 18th century, even as a natural philosopher, John 
Locke ground glass for eyewear and practiced medicine (although medicine was not then 
understood in the same scientific sense that it is today). And although it may be 
surprising to us now, Sir Isaac Newton, in spite of his 1687 treatise, The Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy, was not considered a scientist. There was no separate 
discipline of science. The ideas of these men, as well as the knowledge of philosophers in 
general, resulted from the integration of information from a variety of sources; 
knowledge was not received as a unified corpus. Yet philosophy was generally 
considered a specialization, albeit one often passively received by leisured individuals 
who considered themselves, or were considered by others, to be special. For example, 
during the Renaissance, both Da Vinci (in the late 1400s and early 1500s) and Galileo (in 
the late 1500s) viewed the content and acquisition of knowledge as a specialization. The 
content of knowledge was only available to those few who were deemed worthy by 
divination, stoic study, observation, and, above all, leisure. Knowledge only revealed 
itself to those believed by the clergy to be keenly sensitive to the linearity and hierarchy 
of thought sanctioned by the church. Truths were not science, but they were special, and 
were therefore available to those with specialized skills. Revelation, as well as simple 
observation, requires specialized faculties.  
The acceptance of an individual’s claim of knowledge was dependent on their 
specialized faculties, as well as whether the revelation or discovery was made at the right 
time in history and whether the special individual had powerful friends within the church. 
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Giordano Bruno’s historical timing failed, and in the year 1600 he was burned at the 
stake in Florence for suggesting that the earth was not the center of the universe, while 
years before, Copernicus walked away with his life intact after revealing his astronomical 
discoveries because he had friends within the church, and he died of natural causes. 
Copernicus could “discover” truths, as long as he did not deny or refute revelation.  
However, the acceptance of a knowledge claim as discovered knowledge required 
an enormous intellectual shift away from a view of knowledge as divinely received. 
Moreover, unlike passively received knowledge, Galileo’s discovered knowledge would 
have resulted in him being burned at the stake, regardless of his papal connections, if he 
had admitted that the intellectual work he did was drawn from a coordinated effort to 
integrate discovered knowledge sources. He is thought to have admitted as much, but was 
forced to recant and placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. 
Not until John Dewey, an American Pragmatist philosopher, promulgated a 
generative view of knowledge in the 1920s, did knowledge become thought of as an 
active and ongoing process. Even then, people found it difficult to accept the radical idea 
that knowledge was not a self-contained body waiting to be uncovered. Fifty years later, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, Michel Foucault, French philosopher and feminist of the Second 
Wave, made headway in changing how people think about knowledge formation, from a 
fixed content to a context-dependent process.  
Even during the relatively modern period between the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, knowledge emerged as the specialized product of the industrial revolution’s 
emphasis on humans and what they produced as “precision machines.” “Taylorism,” the 
American theory of labor specialization articulated at the beginning of the 20th century, 
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reinforced the proliferation of experts who were sustained by the knowledge principles of 
efficiency and profit. Business models were streamlined, and boilerplate legal forms were 
developed and installed as examples of useful and objective knowledge.  
During this time, John Dewey’s notion of generative knowledge as knowledge 
that was created rather than discovered (let alone received) was considered a weak form 
of knowledge, if considered knowledge at all. His proposal was that the individual 
process of sifting through perceptions, whether consciously or unconsciously, uses a 
particular intellectual lens and is consequently the actual process of creating ideas. Yet to 
many of his contemporaries, this proposal was considered weak and such knowledge 
untrustworthy or merely subjective. For a man to consider subjective experiences as part 
of the content of knowledge may have been excusable as a simple intermittent thought 
error; however, when women were admitted into philosophy doctorate programs at the 
University of Chicago, one of the few programs outside of Radcliffe, and those women 
flocked toward Dewey’s tutelage, the respect for Dewey’s theories of subjective 
knowledge diminished even more, moving instead toward the more extreme forms of 
analytic philosophy, in which knowledge could be reduced to the most calculated form of 
symbolic logic. Women and their subjective forms of knowledge were subsequently 
shunted off to the new academic disciplinary field of social work, since the women’s 
focus was considered evidence of an inability to acquire real knowledge. Only objective 
knowledge was valued, and since the new academic fields in the hard sciences produced 
objective knowledge, these disciplines superseded philosophy as generators of practical 
knowledge. Yet feminist rage hath duty sworn: most knowledge is contextual and 
subjective. 
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III 
Unfortunately, feminists, both in Women’s Studies and elsewhere, who advocate 
for contextualized, rather than specialized, knowledge have been assailed by criticism 
that such knowledge lacks content. Nonetheless, the feminist notion that most knowledge 
is interdisciplinary remains unchanged. Although the feminist focus on interdisciplinary 
sources of knowledge and the method of knowledge acquisition can be difficult to 
articulate and have been devalued in the academic community, feminist teaching, 
research, and activism prevail in their role as a critique of traditional knowledge. 
Unfortunately, mainstream academics consider a critique of theoretical content to be only 
a strategic technique, mere pedagogy without content. It has therefore been difficult to 
establish Women’s Studies as a department, rather than a program or unit within a school. 
Feminist critique focuses on the method of knowledge acquisition, and is 
therefore the content of feminist knowledge. Method as action determines what counts as 
evidence of knowledge, as well as who gets to create and claim knowledge. Generative 
interdisciplinary knowledge is a vital dimension of Women’s Studies teaching, research, 
and activism. Thus, interdisciplinary knowledge, which might be more accurately 
referenced as coordinated and intentional knowledge acquisition, is created, not 
discovered. But there is an even stronger claim to be made: even the objective knowledge 
of the hard and soft sciences has a contextualized nature that has yet to be faced.  
Meaning is neither revealed nor discovered; we create meaning through the 
directed use of selectively recognized phenomena. As pragmatic feminists, things are and 
things work because our experiences give meaning to them—we choose these things, and 
we make them work by focusing on our chosen goals.1 Pragmatic feminists treat the 
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multidimensional nature of experience as objective knowledge. A major insight of the 
feminist lies in understanding that when knowledge is viewed as created and not 
discovered the distinction between subjective and objective is minimized. When we ask 
whether knowledge is objective or subjective, we should know that we are asking the 
wrong question. The incontrovertible nature of any knowledge lies in its effectiveness 
within a particular context and with particular goals in mind. 
Contemporary American pragmatist and philosopher John Stuhr (1987, p. 329) 
suggests that the source of knowledge is “experience [that] arises from . . . selective 
interests within a background,” and that “selective interest, the concerns or attitude of a 
subject . . . determines or selects the actual subject matter of reflection.” Given selective 
interests, knowledge emerges, determined by a “who” and a “what,” a gendered “who” 
and a gendered “what,” and which criteria count as evidence within particular contexts. 
When we acknowledge the created nature of knowledge, how and what we teach 
changes. Facts (knowledge) are not always about Truth. Facts are not always independent 
entities. We provide ideas, and their truth is derived by circumstance and intended goal. 
Interdisciplinary knowledge does not emerge as if it were always already there. 
Experience is spontaneous, precarious, eventful, and unpredictable. Truths entail new 
meanings, and as such, they are forms of interdisciplinary knowledge.  
Expertise in an academic field constitutes a perspective. Disciplinary perspective 
allows us to observe uniquely without having unique knowledge. But that is not to say 
that expertise does not have valuable content, and this is not to propose the dissolution of 
either expertise or truth. Truths are functional, not all-pervasive. And experts are 
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invaluable for providing certain kinds of knowledge in particular ways and in light of 
certain goals.  
For example, in her early work on feminist methodology, Sandra Harding (1988, 
p. 6) proposed that each problem arising in our lives aims at a particular purpose, derives 
from someone or a group of someones, and exists for particular reasons. This recognition 
has prompted all manner of feminist teachers, researchers, and activists to ask very 
different questions than those asked by traditional philosophers. We ask, “Who gets to 
know?” and “Why does that count as evidence and not this?” and “What assumptions are 
you making?” These are among the variety of unsettling and probing questions that it is 
our job to ask. 
Interdisciplinarity makes us better teachers, researchers, and activists. We are able 
to appeal to students who have a variety of skills; to advocate for the numerous ways 
students learn; to recognize the many bodies of knowledge that emerge from racialized, 
sexed, and classed arenas; and in so doing, we coalesce both the community and political 
groups. In other words, emergent knowledge is the “insider/outsider knowledge” that Bell 
Hooks speaks of, as well as the “situated knowledge” that Donna Haraway refers to. 
Interdisciplinary knowledge as generative knowledge relies on the selective interests of 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s “knowledge community,” and feminist pragmatist Charlene 
Seigfried’s philosophy as a lived experience, a way of being in the world. The inventive 
endeavor is the process of knowing.  
In summary, Women’s Studies creates meanings in political emancipation—in 
ethics as a process of caring; in the politics of sexuality; in personal identity in disability 
studies; and in medical research as something inevitably embedded in particular cultural 
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values. The meaning of a thing is knowledge; we give meaning to ourselves and to our 
experiences. Feminists create knowledge as emergent phenomena. Interdisciplinary 
knowledge sustains us as both seekers and innovators in our teaching, research, and 
activism. 
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Notes 
1. Some feminists are pragmatists. That is, some feminists adhere to the creative 
as a way of knowing; other feminists may consider themselves discoverers of essential or 
inherent femaleness. 
